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Article 8

The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace
Brett M. Frischmann*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the presentations and overall theme of this Conference indicate,
there are interesting and important dynamics between law and
technology. Law and technology are evolutionary systems, both of
which are interdependent. In this Article, I will analyze the manner in
which the emergence of the Internet and its evolution affect legal
decision making. Specifically, I will focus on how perspectives of the
Internet and the way in which it works affect legal analyses and
outcomes.
Cyberlaw scholars have suggested that the outcome of many
cyberlaw disputes depends significantly, if not entirely, on a judge's
perspective of the Internet and how it works. Much of the debate
among scholars focuses on figuring out which is the right perspective
and which is the wrong perspective. Although the debate is not always
explicitly framed in terms of perspectives-it may focus instead on the
use of metaphors, for example-the problem of choosing a perspective
creeps into the debate, one way or another, often confusing or even
preempting normative analysis.
There are two dominant perspectives of the Internet. 1 First, we have
the external perspective, which focuses on the Internet from the

* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This brief
comment elaborates on the prepared remarks I presented at the Law Journal conference,
Technology and Governance: How the Internet Has Shaped Our Conceptions of Governance and
Institutions, in March 2003. I am currently working on a broader research paper, tentatively titled
Reconciling Internetand Cyberspace, which refines and expands some of the ideas touched on in
this comment. I thank Mike Carroll, Cynthia Ho, Mark Lemley, Orin Kerr, Mike Madison, David
McGowan, David Post, and Charles Purcell for their helpful comments and conversations. I also
thank Michelle Togut and Keith Pozulp for their research assistance. I welcome any comments at
bfrisch@luc.edu.
1. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003)
(observing that the two dominant perspectives of the Internet are the internal perspective and the
external perspective).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

outside. 2 From this external perspective, one perceives the Internet in
terms of its technical real-space operations-the Internet is a global

meta-network that serves as an open platform for the transmission of
information among end users that connect computers to the network.
Second, we have the internalperspective, which focuses on the Internet
from the inside. 3 From this internal perspective, one perceives the
Internet in terms of the applications it enables and the ways in which
those applications affect end users; the technical operation of the
network infrastructure may be largely irrelevant in terms of one's
experience. 4 It is this internal perspective that leads to the conception
of cyberspace as a sort of virtual reality.
For about a decade or so, scholars have argued about the merits of
each perspective and which perspective legal decision makers should
choose to adopt. 5 While this debate has proved useful for a number of
reasons, 6 it is time to move beyond the "binary, zero-sum
2. Id. at 360. Imagine a disinterested observer, who is not "logged on," describing how the
Internet works. Id.
3. Id. at 359. Imagine an end user, who is "logged on," describing his or her experience when
using the Internet. Id.
4. Id. at 360 ("The technical details of what the computers attached to the Internet actually do
'behind the scenes' don't particularly matter.").
5. The debate with David Johnson and David Post on one side and Jack Goldsmith on the
other is perhaps the most famous example. This debate focuses on, inter alia, the existence of
cyberspace as a descriptive matter and how, as a normative matter, society should regulate
cyberspace. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998)
[hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy];Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding
Significance of TerritorialSovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998) [hereinafter
Goldsmith, Territorial Sovereignty]; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David G. Post, Against "Against
Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002); see also Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 315 (2002) (discussing this debate); Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439,
447-48 (2003) (discussing this debate); Carl S. Kaplan, Cyberlaw Journal: Finding
Government's Role in a Global Network, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, at http://www.nytimes.coml
library/cyber/law/0710971aw.html (July 10, 1997). Although this debate has not been framed
explicitly in terms of perspectives, there is little doubt that the scholars were arguing vigorously
for a choice of perspective.
6. I will elaborate on the reasons at greater length in my Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace
piece. Articulating a comprehensive argument for recognizing cyberspace as a legitimate
"space," at least in the minds of end users, has "freed our minds"-to use a concept from The
Matrix movie-and allowed us to consider the manner in which technology is affecting existing
regulatory and community structures. Cf.Kerr, supra note 1, at 359 (using the movie The Matrix
to explain external and internal perspectives). "The social meaning of geographical space also
includes the way in which an individual or community perceives those who are outside the
community's topological or social boundaries." Berman, supra note 5, at 426-27. "Conceptions
of jurisdiction become internalized and help to shape the social construction of place and
community... [such that when] social conceptions of place and community change,
jurisdictional rules do as well." Id. at 543.

2003]

The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace

207

debate." 7 In The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, a piece that I
rely on and am responding to in this article, Orin Kerr demonstrates the

pervasiveness of these perspectives and observes that "[b]oth internal
and external perspectives can appear perfectly viable depending on the

circumstances, and courts and commentators switch between them

frequently without even recognizing the change." 8 Kerr argues that "we
need to be aware of the problem of perspective and develop tools that
and virtual understandings of the
can help us choose between real
9
Internet when we apply law to it."
While I agree wholeheartedly with Kerr that "we need to be aware of
the problem of perspective,"' 0 I do not believe that a choice should be
made (by courts, legislators, academics, or anyone else) between an
external perspective focused on the technical operations of the Internet
and an internal perspective focused on end users' experiences. In fact, I
believe that the perceived need to choose among perspectives is itself
problematic. Why should a choice be made? As Kerr observes,
"neither perspective holds an a prioriclaim to greater legitimacy.""l l
Both perspectives are descriptively valid and real, and both
perspectives yield important insights about the facts of the Internet and
the interests at stake in a legal decision. Choosing either perspective
may lead to a partial view of the underlying facts in a given dispute
(essentially, tunnel vision), which may effectively determine the
outcome of a legal decision and bypass the difficult legal (normative)
12
analysis that courts, legislators, and academics should undertake.
7. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet
Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605, 672 (2003) (referring to the debate over cyberspace
governance). I am arguing for a step forward that reconciles the two perspectives by accepting
both as descriptively valid. Accordingly, I reject the contention held by many scholars that "the
metaphor of Cyberspace as a place was a model so far from the technology that it was useful only
as a publicity tool." Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet FirstMet, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 171, 177
(2000); see also Hunter, supra note 5, at 443 (similarly rejecting the common wisdom that "no
one could be foolish enough to argue that cyberspace was a place").
8. Kerr, supra note 1, at 357.
9. Id. at 358 (emphasis added). Kerr proposes two tentative methods that courts might employ
to choose between perspectives: (1) focus on the legal doctrine being applied to the facts and
determine "whether the law is more closely attuned to external or internal concerns," see id. at
391, or (2) "appl[y] the perspective of the individual whom the law seeks to regulate," id. at 39697. I discuss these methods in the context of the Fourth Amendment below. See infra note 43
(analyzing Kerr's application of these perspectives in the Fourth Amendment cases).
10. Kerr, supra note 1, at 357.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Of course, the (mis)use of metaphors leads to precisely the same problem (which point I
will develop fully in Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace). See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 10 (1980) (noting that shaping a concept through the use of
a metaphor can result in ignoring important aspects of the concept because they do not appear
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Moreover, choosing a perspective may subtly substitute fact-finding for
legal analysis and thereby mask important policy decisions in the
13
rhetoric of metaphor and factual analogy.
Here is how I think we should avoid choosing between perspectives:
First, we should recognize that both perspectives provide valid and
accurate renditions of the underlying facts; 14 second, we must carefully
examine the sets of interests at stake in a given dispute; and third, we

must engage in a principled application of relevant legal doctrines
designed to address such interests.
In this Article, I primarily focus on the first step because I believe
that taking the first step alone would be a significant and meaningful
advancement. I illustrate through two examples how a choice of
perspective can dictate the choice of rule or the path that legal analysis
will take.
As I have already noted, choosing a perspective is

consistent with the metaphor); Hunter, supra note 5, passim (arguing that the cyberspace as place
metaphor is descriptively accurate and that the normative question of whether to regulate
cyberspace as a place is a distinct matter); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and
Competition on the Internet: In Search of an AppropriateAnalogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561,

580(2001).
It is not surprising that courts have been unable to settle on the appropriate analogy and
cause of action reflecting one or more specific policies. The factual situation
underlying the issues of who should have access to a website and by what means is
unlike any with which courts have grappled in the past.
Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 525 (2003).

Perhaps it is this automatic connection to pages that come from distant lands that
makes us feel as though we are traveling through cyberspace. But if so, it is surely the
supreme irony of the cyberspatial metaphor. For it is precisely this automatic
interconnection between data offered by different people in different places that makes
the Internet so different from the physical world. And indeed, it is this very
interconnection that courts using the Cyberspace As Place metaphor threaten to
eliminate by treating the Internet 'just like' the physical world.
Id.; Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the "Devil's Hatband," 24 SEATILE U. L. REV. 577, 592

(2000) ("The perception of cyberspace as separate from real space also tends to encourage a
belief that cyberspace is an actual jurisdiction separate from the polities that exist in real space
and, therefore, should be governed in ways that traditional political processes cannot be trusted to
handle."); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1230-31 (2002) (arguing that when the western

frontier metaphor is applied to determine the breadth of government regulation on the Internet,
the metaphor's validity must first be analyzed).
13. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 474.
14. I should note that Kerr seems to advocate taking this step, see Kerr, supra note 1, at 357,
but in the end, he argues that courts should develop tools for choosing between perspectives in
different contexts, see supra note 9 (detailing the two methods Kerr proposes to aid in choosing
between perspectives).

2003]

The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace

209

fact-finding
problematic because it may act as a shortcut that substitutes
15

for legal analysis without a principled basis for doing so.

I address the second step in some detail in the discussion of the
evolving common-law doctrine of trespass to chattels and its application
in cyberlaw disputes. The second step requires us to examine what
interests are at stake in a given dispute. Cyberlaw disputes tend to
involve the following types of interests: (1) physical, tangible assets like
computer network facilities, routers, and servers; (2) intangible
information assets ranging from copyright-protected expression to
public domain data; and (3) relational assets like goodwill and trust and
community values-in other words, assets based on relationships
among people. Of course, we may be able to identify other interests,
but these three categories should suffice for our purposes. Legal
doctrines tend to focus on a particular set of interests. (For example,
property law focuses on physical, tangible assets.) Courts applying
traditional legal doctrine or developing new doctrine in cyberlaw cases
between the three types of
should appreciate the connections (or links)
16
Internet.
the
via
possible
made
interests

15. Choosing to adopt a perspective may lead to path dependence. Path dependence is often
thought of in terms of relative switching costs: taking an action today may effectively set the path
for future action because the costs of changing paths become prohibitive. See Mark J. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643 (1996) (stating that
path dependence occurs when a system that was once efficient fails to change not because of its
current efficiency but because of the costs associated with change); Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 269, 307 n.154 (1999). Benjamin noted that:
Many commentators, in fact, have suggested that path dependence-the condition
obtaining when initial developments (e.g., how to design and control a network) will
have a significant effect on later developments (e.g., how the network is used) by
rendering some otherwise plausible later developments unlikely because of the cost of
like
fields
fast-changing
well
to
particularly
anew-applies
starting
telecommunications and cyberspace.
Id. (citing Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 597-98 (1998)); Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction,
and Modernism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 576-79 (1998) (noting that "there are
transition costs, based on path dependence or network externalities, that form barriers to
change"). With respect to the adjudication of a particular dispute, choosing to view the facts
through the lens of one perspective-perhaps as a means for understanding "what is
happening"-may lead the decision maker down a particular decision path. Although the
alternative perspective may paint a different, factually-valid picture, and the collage created by
taking both perspectives together may create an even more complicated factual puzzle, the
switching costs may be too great, and the decision maker may be locked in to a chosen
perspective.
16. For example, as discussed in the latter half of this Article, courts applying the trespass to
chattels doctrine in cyberlaw disputes should appreciate the fact that, in contrast with traditional
trespass to chattels cases, all three types of interests noted above are at stake. In particular, see
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The third step, which I touch on only briefly in this Article, may be
the most difficult because it requires us to reconsider (and perhaps
recalibrate) the balancing of interests struck by existing law, and/or to
17
consider complex intersections among different areas of the law.
With respect to the first task, it is well understood that law develops
to protect and balance particular sets of interests in factual context, and
that evolving technology can change the factual context and thereby

unbalance previously struck balances (e.g., consider copyright law in
the digital age). 18 With respect to the second task, it may be less
understood that a change in factual context may bring into relief
complex intersections between traditionally independent areas of the
law. 19 It is critical for those evaluating and applying law and for those
creating new law to understand and fully appreciate changes in factual
context. Recognizing the validity and utility of both the external and
internal perspectives may engender such an appreciation; whereas
choosing one perspective over the other may simply lead to tunnel

vision.

infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (arguing that the traditional trespass to chattels doctrine
cannot be applied in a vacuum due to the three interests at stake in cyberlaw disputes).
17. I address the third step only briefly in this Article but consider it in significant detail in my
Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace paper. I should note, however, that whether such analysis
will be necessary depends, of course, on the particular dispute.
18. Copyright law provides only the most obvious example of the unbalancing of previouslystruck balances by the changed factual context of the Internet. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dodes, Beyond
Napster, Beyond the United States: The Technological and International Legal Barriersto OnLine Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 287 (2002-03) (claiming that the
"Internet allows infringement of nearly all forms of copyrighted materials"); Lawrence Lessig,
Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (observing that changes
in technology alter the policy balance struck in laws protecting intellectual property); John R.
Therien, Exorcising The Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving FairUse and
the Public Domain in the DigitalAge, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 983-84 (2001). Therien
observed that:
Congress recognized, however, that the indiscriminate legal reinforcement of TPSs
[technical protection systems] favored digital media producers over users and therefore
potentially threatened otherwise permissible access to-and traditional fair use ofcopyrighted materials for valuable endeavors like education. Congress, sensing that it
was shifting the balance of intellectual property law too far toward copyright owners,
added a complex set of exceptions to the general ban on circumvention.
Id; see also Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 1367 ("Cyberspace challenges the law's traditional
reliance on territorial borders; it is a 'space' bounded by screens and passwords rather than
physical markers."); David McGowan, Website Access: The Casefor Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 341, 353-58 (2003) (suggesting that technology has "undermined" the balance of interests
reflected in traditional trespass to chattels doctrine).
19. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (noting intersection of trespass to chattels with
intellectual property and First Amendment law).

2003]

The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace

211

II. DISCUSSION
Judges have always faced the difficult but necessary task of applying
constitutional, statutory, and common law to facts involving complex
technologies. 20 In such cases, courts generally must determine what the
relevant facts are and then apply the appropriate law to those facts. As
Kerr observes, the emergence of the Internet poses a problem for courts
because the Internet can generate two distinct sets of facts, one set based
on the external perspective and the second set based on the internal
perspective. 2 1 Thus, as Kerr aptly explains, the Internet's facts may
depend on the lens or perspective we choose. 22 The following chart
summarizes Kerr's elaboration of the two perspectives and how they
relate to each other.
Perspective

External

Internal

Viewpoint

"[A]n outsider concerned with the
functioning of the network in the
physical world. .23

"[U]ser who is logged
on to the Internet and
chooses to accept the
virtual world of
cyberspace as a
24
legitimate construct."

View of the

Internet

"[T]he Internet is simply a network of
computers located around the world
and connected by wires and cables.

"[A] computer
connected to the
Internet provides a

The hardware sends, stores, and

window to a virtual

receives communications [in the form
of digital ones and zeroes] using a
series of common protocols.
Keyboards provide sources of input to
the network, and monitors provide
destinations for output. When the

world that is roughly
analogous to the
physical world of real
space. The user can use
her keyboard and

mouse to go shopping,

20. For simplicity, I will focus on judicial decision making in this paper and postpone
consideration of the broader problem of perspective as it relates to the link between descriptive
and normative analyses.
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that, when analyzing Internet cases,
courts choose between two perspectives that both appear viable).
22. Kerr, supra note 1, at 362 (explaining that the two perspectives lead to different factual
versions of the Internet).
23. Id. at 360.
24. Id. at 359. For the purposes of this paper, I will use Kerr's definition of the internal
perspective. However, I believe a better definition would leave open the possibility that an end
user does not accept the cyberspace construct when describing his or her experience. In other
words, it is sufficient to focus simply on end users' perceptions of their experiences and to leave
open the empirical question of whether end users employ the virtual reality construct in particular
circumstances. I am developing this broader view in my Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace
paper.
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Perspective

View of the
Other
Perspective

25.

External
Internet runs properly, trillions of
zeros and ones zip around the world,
sending and receiving
communications that the computers
connected to the network can translate
into commands, text, sound, and
25
pictures."
"[T]he fact that Internet users may
perceive that they have entered a
virtual world of cyberspace has no
particular relevance. These
perceptions reflect the fact that
software designers often garnish their
applications with icons, labels, and
graphics to help novices understand
and use them-for example, by
writing e-mail programs so that e-mail
looks and feels like postal mail.
These superficialities have no deeper
meaning from the external
perspective. What matters is the
physical network and the technical
details of how it works, not the easily
manipulated perceptions of Internet
27
users."

[Vol. 35

Internal
send mail, visit a chat
room, participate in an
online community, or
do anything else 26
she
can find online."

"The technical details
of what the computers
attached to the Internet
actually do 'behind the
scenes' don't
particularly matter.
What matters is the
virtual world of
cyberspace that the user
encounters and interacts
with when he or she
goes online." 28

Id. at 360 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997), and PRESTON GRALLA, How

THE INTERNET WORKS 6-7 (1999)).
26. Kerr, supra note 1, at 360. Many constraints of the real world seem less important. For
example, geographical borders lose their meaning to those surfing cyberspace. See, e.g., Johnson
& Post, supra note 5, at 1370. In fact:
The rise of the global computer network is destroying the link between geographical
location and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over online behavior;
(2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local
sovereign's efforts to regulate global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical
location to give notice of which sets of rules apply.
Id.; see also, e.g., Yen, supra note 12, at 1225-26 ("For them, the absence of conventional
geographical borders in cyberspace removes territory as a justification for sovereign
jurisdiction."). In cyberspace, one can speak nearly instantaneously to crowds dispersed across
the globe. See id. at 1226 ("Individuals in cyberspace can visit an infinite number of people and
places because everyone is simply a few mouse clicks away."). For example, the panel members'
ability to speak at the Conference to crowds was limited in the real world not only by distance,
but also by physical barriers and the strength of our vocal chords; in cyberspace, such constraints
disappear.
27. Kerr, supra note 1, at 360.
28.

Id.
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Okay, so there are two ways of looking at things-so what? What is
the problem? In addition to explaining the existence of these two
perspectives, Kerr considers what he calls the "Problem of Perspective."
This problem is that a choice of one perspective over the other often
will be outcome-determinative when it comes to the legal analysis.
Again, I agree with Kerr that this is a problem. Kerr uses a number of
examples to illustrate the outcome-determinative nature of choosing a
perspective. I'll borrow his first and simplest example to illustrate the
point.
A. FourthAmendment Protectionof E-mail Messages
Imagine that A sends an e-mail to his friend B. Two police officers
learn about the e-mail and believe that it might reveal a nefarious
criminal conspiracy. The officers agree that they should try to obtain
a copy of the e-mail to prove the conspiracy. They confront a legal
question: what kind of legal process must they follow in order to
obtain the e-mail? Does the Fourth Amendment require them to
obtain a search warrant? Or can they obtain the e-mail with less
process than a search warrant? The answer depends largely upon
whether they apply an internal or external perspective of the
29
Internet.
Assume each police officer adopts a perspective to determine what
legal process the Fourth Amendment requires. The police officer that
adopts the internal perspective asks herself: What do end users
subjectively expect when they send e-mail? The officer may reasonably
conclude that end users perceive e-mail as the online equivalent of
postal mail, given her awareness of things like "You've got mail ' 30 and
31
similar attributes of e-mail programs designed to reinforce this belief.
Of course, this is a factual question, and the officer may lack the
information necessary to make an accurate factual finding as to what
end users subjectively believe. I should note that at this point, the
officer is not applying the law, i.e., the Fourth Amendment test
developed in Katz v. United States;32 the officer is simply asking

29. Id. at 365.
30. See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[I]n connection
with its e-mail service, AOL advises its subscribers that they have received e-mail by displaying
the words 'You Have Mail,' by playing a recording that announces, 'You've got mail,' and by
depicting an icon of a traditional mailbox with the red flag raised,").
31. See Kerr, supra note 1,at 360 ("These perceptions reflect the fact that software designers
often garnish their applications with icons, labels, and graphics to help novices understand and
use them-for example, by writing e-mail programs so that e-mail looks and feels like postal
mail." (citing NATHAN J. MULLER, DESKTOP ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE INTERNET 87-95 (1999))).
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
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herself: What are the facts? What happens when an end user sends an
e-mail? One answer, based on the internal perspective, is that an end
user sends the cyberspace equivalent of postal mail. As Kerr observes,
this characterization of what happens (standing alone, without reference
to the external perspective) would lead the officer to reason toward a
legal conclusion as follows:
[T]he Fourth Amendment places the same restriction on government
access to e-mail that it places on government access to ordinary postal
mail.... [A]ccessing a suspect's [postal] mail ordinarily violates the
suspect's "reasonable expectation of privacy," and... therefore the
officer must first obtain a warrant. Because e-mail is the equivalent of
postal mail, the officer will conclude that the Fourth Amendment
33
requires him to obtain a warrant before he can access the e-mail.
The police officer that adopts the external perspective reaches a
different result. This officer similarly asks herself: What are the facts?
What happens when an end user sends an e-mail? The facts look quite
different, however. Focusing on how the Internet operates, the second
officer sees that when A sends an e-mail to B, A instructs her Internet
Service Provider ("ISP") to send the e-mail to B's ISP, and during the
delivery process, both ISPs make copies of the e-mail. As Kerr
observes, this characterization of what happens (standing alone, without
reference to the internal perspective) would lead the officer to reason
toward a legal conclusion as follows:
A sent a copy of the e-mail communication to a third
party... disclosing the communication to the third party and
instructing it to send the communication to yet another third
party .... [W]hat process does the Fourth Amendment require to
obtain information that has been disclosed to a third party and is in the
third party's possession?... [T]he black letter rule [is] that the Fourth
Amendment permits the government to obtain information disclosed
to a third party using a mere subpoena. The officer can simply
subpoena the [ISP] 34to compel [it] to produce the e-mails. No search
warrant is required.
This is a relatively simple example. The point of using the example
is to illustrate how a choice of perspective can be outcome-

33. Kerr, supra note 1, at 365-66 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has held numerous times in various
different contexts that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed to third
parties. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966). Yet the Supreme Court has not so held in the context of e-mail, and, as
discussed below, the Internet context differs from these other contexts in important ways.
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determinative. Choosing a perspective leads to a distinct set of facts
35
and consequently to a choice of legal rule.

35. Another interesting example, which I consider in detail in Reconciling Internet and
Cyberspace, arises in a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003). The case involves a First Amendment challenge to the Children's
Internet Pornography Act ("CIPA"), which requires libraries that receive federal funding to
provide their patrons with Internet access and use filtering software to prevent patrons from
viewing visual depictions of obscenity, child pornography, or, in the case of minors, material that
is harmful to them. The district court accepted plaintiffs' argument that providing Internet access
in a library created a designated public forum and, applying strict scrutiny review, held that CIPA
was facially invalid. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407, 411 (E.D.
Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
The parties' Supreme Court briefs reflected two competing perspectives on the provision of
(filtered) access to the Internet in public libraries. The government argued that when libraries
filter access to the Internet, they are simply deciding what content to bring into the library and
make available to its patrons. Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) (No. 02-361), available at LEXIS 2002 U.S. Briefs 361. Taking
an external perspective, the government suggested that the Internet is simply another means for
bringing content into the library, perfectly analogous to ordinary, traditional book collection
decisions; from this perspective of the facts, patrons send a request for information, and the
library simply filters what may be brought into the library. Id. Content-based decisions of this
sort have long been part of the public library function, are essential to the management of the
library's property (government property), and were never intended to create a public forum
(technically, a designated public forum). Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Arguments at 3, Am.
Library Ass'n (No. 02-361) ("Libraries are simply exercising their discretion as to the content
their libraries will contain ... and to how their library resources will be used."), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcipts/02-361.pdf
(last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
Taking the internal perspective, the American Library Association and ACLU argued that
libraries are providing end users with access to a vast public forum, a virtual sea of information.
When libraries provide Internet access, they open "a portal to the nearly unlimited expression
available in cyberspace," involving a "virtually unlimited number of speakers on a virtually
unlimited number of topics." Brief for the American Library Association at 19, 22, Am. Library
Ass'n (No. 02-361), available at 2003 WL 21699050. End users are given access to something
that exists outside of and apart from the library. Cf. id. at 20 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997)). The case provides an excellent example of a situation in which the outcome of the case
seems to turn in large part on the Supreme Court's choice of perspective because the choice
determines the level of scrutiny to apply. Under the government's perspective of what happens
when a library provides Internet access, rational basis scrutiny applies because Internet access is
available on government property and the government is not creating a public forum, but under
the libraries' perspective, strict scrutiny applies because the government has created a designated
public forum. Of course, the problem of perspective is that both perspectives are valid and
accurate. Providing access to the Internet is both content collection and a "portal" to an unlimited
number of speech forums in cyberspace.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court decision and held that CIPA was constitutional.
The plurality opinion adopted the external perspective of the facts proposed by the government,
expressly stating that the Internet "is 'no more than a technological extension of the book stack."'
See Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 7 (1999)). In fact,
the only rationale the Court provided for applying rational basis scrutiny was viewing the
provision of filtered Internet access as perfectly analogous (rather than partially analogous) to the
provision of collected books, id. at 2303-05, under which ultimately the Court found the CIPA
constitutional, id. at 2309.
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Having demonstrated that a choice of perspective can be outcomedeterminative, Kerr then argues that courts must evaluate competing
perspectives on how the Internet works and consciously decide between
two distinct sets of facts: one based on physical reality, and the other
based on virtual reality. 36 He concludes
that "the shape of Internet law
37
hinges on our choice of perspective."
I would hazard a guess that most other cyberlaw scholars would

agree with this conclusion. As I noted at the outset, for more than a
decade, there has been a rich and often contentious scholarly debate
over the choice of perspective. Famously, David Johnson and David
Post advocated the position that cyberspace should be recognized as a
separate "place" independent and insulated from regulation of territorial
sovereigns. 3 8 As a descriptive matter, Johnson and Post contended that
cyberspace exists and that important differences between cyberspace
and real space undermined the capacity of sovereign nations to regulate
cyberspace. 39 As a normative matter, they argued that sovereign
nations should not regulate cyberspace, even if they had the capacity to
Interestingly, the Supreme Court noted that "' [W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy
in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in
such a new and changing area."' Id. at 2305 n.3 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion)). Although the
Supreme Court acknowledged the danger of "partial analogy in one context, for which we have
developed doctrines," the plurality failed to see that its analysis merely rejected one partial
analogy for another (filtered Internet access is analogous to selected books collection). Id.; see
also id. at 2318-22 (Souter, J., dissenting) (relying on partial analogies as well-access to
unfiltered Internet content is analogous to an acquiredbook, and thus, filtering Internet content is
analogous "either to buying a book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable
'purpose,' or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to be
unsuitable for all adults"). But see id. at 2310-12 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (suggesting that
neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis scrutiny apply because of the special circumstances and
describing the circumstances in terms of (1) CIPA "directly restrict[ing] the public's receipt of
information ... through limitations imposed... upon two critically important sources of
information-the Internet as accessed via public libraries" and (2) CIPA being a "'selection'
restriction (a kind of editing) [that] affects the kinds and amount of materials that the library can
present to its patrons").
36. Kerr, supra note 1, at 361-62. I agree with Kerr that it is better for courts (and
commentators) to make conscious decisions about a choice of perspective and to make such
decisions explicitly than for courts (and commentators) to rely inadvertently on a single
perspective or to shift inadvertently from one perspective to another depending on which
perspective supports a particular outcome. I think that it would be even better if courts refused to
choose between perspectives and instead recognized the validity and utility of each perspective.
37. Id. at 362 (emphasis added). There is quite a bit more to Kerr's piece than I have
described here.
38. Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 1378-81.
39. Id. at 1370 ("Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant
(online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global computer network is destroying
the link between geographical location and.., the legitimacy of a local sovereign's efforts to
regulate global phenomena ....).
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do so.0 On the other side of this debate, Jack Goldsmith, taking a
decidedly external perspective, argued that there is no such thing as
cyberspace and sovereign nations could and should regulate online
activity. 4 1 This debate over whether sovereign nations could or should
regulate the Internet/cyberspace has generated quite a bit of scholarship,
much of which has moved beyond the question of sovereignty but
nonetheless retained the underlying competition between perspectives.
I believe that we should move beyond this debate over choice of
perspective. The debate has been extremely useful in the sense that it
allows us to understand, appreciate, and differentiate the Internet and
cyberspace. Differentiating between the Internet and cyberspace makes
sense because the Internet and cyberspace are "real," but different. The
Internet can be understood as the real-space physical and logical
infrastructures that enable applications and content delivery, while
cyberspace may be understood as the "virtual-world" experiences based
on human beings' use of Internet-enabled applications and the
consumption of content communicated across the Internet.
Differentiation is one thing, but I do not think that a choice needs to be
made (by courts, legislators, academics, or anyone else) between
Internet or cyberspace perspectives. In fact, I believe that making a
42
choice is itself part of the problem.
When there are two accurate perspectives regarding the underlying
facts, courts should not choose between perspectives. First, both
perspectives provide valuable factual information that should be
factored into a decision. Second, the adoption of one perspective over
40. Id. at 1390-91 ("[For online activities that minimally affect the vital interests of
sovereigns, the self-regulating structures of Cyberspace seem better suited to dealing with the
Net's legal issues.").
41. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,supra note 5, at 1238-39. Goldsmith states:
The skeptics have provided no reason to think that the differences between cyberspace
and prior communication technology are so much greater than the differences between
pre-and post-telegraph technology (which reduced communication time from weeks
and months to hours and minutes), or between pre- and post-telephone technology
(which also dramatically reduced the cost and enhanced the frequency and privacy of
transjurisdictional communication) to justify the conclusion that governmental
regulation will be nonefficacious.
Id.; see also Goldsmith, Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 5, at 476 ("The Internet is not, as
many suggest, a separate place removed from our world. [T]he Internet is a medium through
which people in real space in one jurisdiction communicate with people in real space in another
jurisdiction.").
42. I acknowledge that Kerr does not advocate making a choice blindly. He similarly argues
that both perspectives should be acknowledged as valid. However, he believes that ultimately a
choice should be made. See supra note 9 (describing Kerr's proposed methods for choosing
which perspective to adopt); infra note 43 (discussing Kerr's proposed methods for choosing a
perspective in the Fourth Amendment context). This is where we disagree, as I explain below.
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another can color the facts in a manner that effectively determines the
outcome of the legal analysis. Of course, it is not surprising that the
debate is focused on choosing perspectives. As lawyers, we all know

that viewing the facts in a light most favorable to our client may have a
significant effect on legal outcomes. And the choice of perspective in
the cyberlaw context often has such an effect-it often can be outcomedeterminative.
What is interesting about Kerr's e-mail hypothetical is that there is an
overarching, single legal rule to apply: the Fourth Amendment.43 The
choice of perspective seems to make it easier to pick among subsidiary
rules developed by courts in analogous factual contexts (e.g., context A:
45
postal mail,44 or context B: communication disclosed to a third party).
In this hypothetical (context C: e-mail), regardless of which perspective
you choose or whether you choose a perspective at all, the interests at
stake balanced by the law remain the same (privacy versus government
investigation). Choosing a perspective means that the balance struck in

an analogous context (A or B) will apply in the new context (C). Such a
choice shortchanges the legal analysis in the sense that the adoption of a
perspective leads to the adoption of a particular black letter rule based
on a simple factual analogy, and without consideration of factual
nuances present in context C and the underlying principles motivating
the rules developed in contexts A and B. At a minimum, recognizing
43. Interestingly, Kerr appears to be willing to choose a single overarching perspective for all
Fourth Amendment cases. That is, applying his first method of choosing a perspective by looking
to doctrine for direction, Kerr attempts to determine which perspective should apply in all Fourth
Amendment cases-imagine what a sweeping evidentiary rule this would be! However, since
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not indicate clearly that one perspective should be chosen, Kerr
applies his second method of choosing a perspective by choosing the perspective of the entity
being regulated by the Fourth Amendment-government officials. This outcome seems equally
troubling both because of its breadth and because it excludes relevant facts from consideration.
One problem with this latter approach to choosing a perspective is that it fails to account for the
fact that the Fourth Amendment regulates the relationship between government officials and
citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
44. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). The Supreme Court held in Jackson that:
No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the
mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination
to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
Id.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (affirming that entrusting a
third party with information destroys an expectation of privacy).
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the validity of both perspectives as a factual matter provides a factual
distinction or complication that allows us to consider whether a new
balancing of interests makes sense. Because the hypothetical presents
only a binary choice (reasonable expectation of privacy or not), the
outcome in this new context (C) ultimately will be the same as that in an
old, analogous context (A or B), but that does not mean that a choice
between perspectives must (or inevitably will) 46 be made.
The
analyticalprocess matters.
Both perspectives of the facts are partially accurate and relevant, and
both reveal important insights regarding the underlying balance of
interests at issue. From the internal perspective, we may find that users
think of e-mail like postal mail.4 7 This finding may indicate a strong
subjective expectation of privacy. 48 From the external perspective, we

may find that, due to the manner in which the Internet actually works,
third parties who may access the contents have received and stored the
e-mail. 4 9 This finding may render any subjective expectation of privacy
held by end users unreasonable, perhaps on the theory that end users
should know how the Internet actually works and not rely on the
software features that generate and reinforce associations between email and postal mail. Or perhaps it is perfectly reasonable for users to
have a strong subjective expectation of privacy, given the highly
technical nature of the manner in which Internet communications are
handled.
46. That the legal outcome in context C ultimately may be the same as the outcome in context
A (or B), for example, does not necessarily mean that the internal (or external) perspective has
been chosen; it means that the balancing of interests in context C is the same.
47. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 1,at 365-66 (discussed supra notes 30-33 and accompanying
text); see also Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: EstablishingFourth Amendment Protection
for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (1997) [hereinafter Note, Keeping
Secrets] ("[C]ommentators discussing privacy in cyberspace often have compared e-mail to
traditional postal mail.").
48. See, e.g., Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 116 & n.212 (1994) (asserting that, as long as the electronic
communication is "not accessible to the general public," then "the logic of Fourth Amendment
case law protecting traditional mail should extend to electronic mail"); Note, Keeping Secrets,
supra note 47, at 1597 ("Individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in sealed firstclass mail sent through the postal system .. ").See generallyJackson, 96 U.S. at 732-33.
49. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Unlike postal mail, simple email generally is not 'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers
between the sender and recipient ....), afffd, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Kerr, supra
note 1,at 367 (discussed supra note 34 and accompanying text); Scott A. Sundstrom, You've Got
Mail! (and the Government Knows It): Applying the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail
Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2064, 2089 (1998) ("Copies of all incoming and outgoing e-mail
pass through, and are usually stored on, a central computer on their way to the recipient.
Employers could argue that employees disclose the contents of their e-mail messages because
they are stored on computers over which the employer has control and access.")
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Whether an end user's subjective expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable or legitimate in this context should not turn on
the adoption of one perspective over the other. 50 While the internal
perspective may support the analogy of e-mail to postal mail,5 1
tempered perhaps by the analogy of cyberspace to "open fields," 5 2 and
the external perspective may support the analogy of e-mail to a
telephone conversation, 5 3 all of these partial analogies (and the many
others that we could develop) shed light on relevant facts and nuances
that courts ought to take into account fully when applying the law.
Factual nuances illuminated by both perspectives should complicate the
analysis undertaken by courts. 54 Choosing a perspective, whether
consciously or not, appears to be too blunt a method for screening facts
for relevancy. Again, the point here is not to propose an answer to the
question of whether sending e-mail gives rise to a reasonable
expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. The point
is simply to show (1) that each perspective highlights different sets of
relevant facts, (2) that a choice of perspective leads to tunnel vision, and
(3) that the constitutional question is significantly more nuanced than
either perspective standing alone would suggest.
While the Fourth Amendment hypothetical is useful for illustrating
how a choice of perspective may be outcome-determinative, it does not
50. As the Supreme Court noted in UnitedStates v. American LibraryAss'n, "'[W]e are wary
of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can
compel a full range of decisions in such a new and changing area."' United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 n.3 (2003) (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion)). But see supra note 35
(discussing the Supreme Court's self-contradictory adoption of the external perspective).
51. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 359-60 (discussing the user's internal perspective of a virtual
world when in cyberspace).
52. See R.A. Conrad, Searching for Privacy in All the Wrong Places: Using Government
Computers To Surf Online, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 38 (2001) ("The boundless nature of cyberspace
is much more akin to 'open fields' than to the privacy of a home or office under this approach,
which does not bode well for finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail.").
53. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that Internet
users have the same expectation of privacy in their Internet conversations as they would in
telephone conversations in part because "the technology used to communicate via e-mail is
extraordinarily analogous to a telephone conversation").
54. A few examples of such considerations include whether: (1) the conflict occurred in an
employer-employee setting, see Sundstrom, supra note 49, at 2071-72; (2) the content was
password protected, see Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417; Charles N. Pede, Driving 'Naked'; Privacy in
Cyberspace;and Expansive 'PrimaryPurpose' Developments in Search, Seizure, and Urinalysis,
1997 ARMY LAW. 20; (3) the e-mail service provider stores the e-mail on its own computers, see
Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 416-17; (4) the e-mail was sent as an instant message, see Hunter, supra note
5, at 497; and (5) the e-mail was sent through a chat room, Hunter, supra note 5, at 496-97; see
also United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1183-84 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a message sent to a chat room).
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present the situation where a choice of perspective leads to a myopic
focus on one set of interests while excluding from consideration other
important interests. To illustrate this situation, let's consider the
evolving common-law doctrine of trespass to chattels and its application
in cyberlaw disputes.
55

B. The Evolving Common-Law Doctrine of Trespass to Chattels

A number of courts have breathed new life into the common-law
doctrine of trespass to chattels by applying it to cyberlaw disputes
concerning access to websites and computer systems. 56 Academics
have critiqued this development primarily on three related grounds by
arguing that:57 (1) the courts improperly rely on the metaphor of
cyberspace as place; 5 8 (2) courts improperly conflate trespass to land
and trespass to chattels by effectively eliminating the actual damages
element of the trespass to chattels cause of action; 59 and (3) courts are

55. I further analyze the evolving doctrine of trespass to chattels in Reconciling Internet and
Cyberspace. Brett M. Frischmann, Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace (2003), (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
56. See Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. COO-0724 JCS, 2001 WL
1736382, at *11-13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d
238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071-72
(N.D. Cal. 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am.
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-23 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46
Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1563 (Ct. App. 1996); see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (discussing the application of the
tresspass to chattels doctrine in eBay and distinguishing eBay from the facts and questions present
in Ticketmaster).
57. For the most influential academic criticism of the application of trespass to chattels in
cyberlaw disputes, see Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 27, 48-49 (2000). See also Nina Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual
Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 165, 171 (2001)
(arguing that search engines are a political and economic asset, creating an efficient information
economy). But see I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J.
ONLINE L. art. 7, at http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html; McGowan, supra
note 18, at 360-66 (defending application of the doctrine and maintaining that, as a normative
matter, a property rule should govern disputes over website access because such a rule facilitates
private transactions and consequently an efficient allocation of resources).
58. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 443 (arguing that treating cyberspace as place creates
"anticommons property").
59. The trespass to chattels cause of action consists of two standards, a conduct standard and a
liability standard. The conduct standard indicates when a trespass to chattel occurs and the
liability standard indicates when a trespasser may be held liable for his or her conduct. A plaintiff
must satisfy both standards to maintain a cause of action.
Conduct standard: A trespass to chattels occurs when someone intentionally damages or
interferes with the use of another's chattel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217-21
(1965). One interferes with the use of another's chattel by "dispossessing another of the chattel"
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effectively creating a new intellectual property right. 60 Although the

arguments are more nuanced, most of the academic criticism seems to
build from the premise that courts are simply not understanding or fully
appreciating the underlying facts of the dispute. The factual context of

the Internet ("new context") differs from the factual contexts in which
the trespass to chattels cause of action traditionally applies ("traditional
context") and in which trespass to land applies ("land context"). The

interests at stake in the new context are more varied than in the
traditional or land contexts. The balance of interests struck in the
traditional or land contexts might not be optimal in the new context
because the interests at stake in each of the three contexts are
different. 6 1 I agree with David McGowan that "normative analysis is
needed."' 62 Before proceeding with normative analysis, however, I
suggest we reconcile the differing perspectives of the facts and
determine what sets of interests are at stake when we apply trespass to
chattels in this new context.
There are two types of trespass to chattels cases involving "computer
systems," such as proprietary networks, servers, computers, and other
computer/network resources at the "ends" of the Internet
infrastructure. 6 3 In push cases (or spam cases), the defendant sends
or "using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another" without authorization. Id

§ 217.
Liability standard:Liability depends upon a showing of actual damages, see id. §§ 218-20 and
comments thereto, in all circumstances but one: for trespass to chattel by dispossession, an
"action will lie although there has been no impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the
chattel, and no other harm to any interest of the possessor." Id. § 218 cmt. d. In contrast with the
trespass to chattels cause of action, trespass to land does not require a showing of actual damages
to sustain a cause of action. Id. § 163. Intentional trespassory conduct alone is sufficient. Id.
The trespassory conduct in each of the cases cited above, see cases cited supra note 56,
involved interference with the plaintiffs chattel, not dispossession, and thus each plaintiff should
have been required to show actual damages to obtain relief. Much of the criticism of these cases
has focused on whether plaintiffs were in fact required to show damages. Eliminating the
damages element of the trespass to chattels cause of action based on unauthorized use or
intermeddling effectively conflates either (1)trespass to chattels with trespass to land or (2)
trespass by unauthorized use or intermeddling with trespass by dispossession. As seen below, the
perceived conflation may be a result of choosing the internal perspective.
60. The argument that courts are creating a new intellectual property right stems from the
notion that server owners are not really exerting control over their chattel property, namely
servers and similar computer systems. Rather, they are controlling access to and use of
information that is not protected by any existing intellectual property law. I explain this a bit
more below in the context of the external perspective. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying
text (applying the external perspective to the facts in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.).
61. Cf.Burk, supra note 57, at 33 (noting that trespass to chattels and trespass to land "secure
entirely different interests").
62. McGowan, supra note 18, at 358.
63. For ease of reference, I simply refer to servers, keeping in mind the variety of other
resources at the "ends."
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unwanted e-mail to end users that obtain e-mail from the plaintiffs
server without the plaintiff's (or the end users') consent. 64 In pull cases
(or web crawler or spider cases), the defendant employs a software
robot to search for and retrieve information housed in the plaintiff's
server. 65 Although both push and pull cases present interesting and
important issues to consider, I will only discuss the pull scenario in this
Article.
In eBay v. Bidder's Edge, perhaps the most famous pull case,
Bidder's Edge used a software robot to gather pricing information from
eBay's website. 66 Next, Bidder's Edge aggregated that information
with pricing information it obtained from other auction websites and
made the aggregated information available on the Bidder's Edge
website. 67 On a trespass to chattels theory, where the chattel was the
plaintiffs server 68 and the trespass was the defendant's unauthorized
64. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (sending
unsolicited bulk e-mail constituted trespass to chattels); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d
548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1020-23 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same). But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003)
(sending unsolicited e-mail does not give rise to a cause of action for trespass to chattels).
65. See Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. COO-0724 JCS, 2001
WL1736382, at *11-13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (deciding not to dismiss trespass to chattels
claim where defendant allegedly used a software robot to copy metatag information);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (unauthorized use
of software robot to harvest information was trespass to chattels); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (same).
66. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-63. The court in eBay described the problems caused by
software robots as follows:
A software robot is a computer program which operates across the Internet to perform
searching, copying and retrieving functions on the web sites of others. A software
robot is capable of executing thousands of instructions per minute, far in excess of
what a human can accomplish. Robots consume the processing and storage resources
of a system, making that portion of the system's capacity unavailable to the system
owner or other users. Consumption of sufficient system resources will slow the
processing of the overall system and can overload the system such that it will
malfunction or "crash." A severe malfunction can cause a loss of data and an
interruption in services.
Id. at 1060-61 (footnote and citations omitted).
67. Professor McGowan goes over the case in more detail in his article in this Symposium.
See McGowan, supra note 18, at 349-52.
68. To be clear, "capacity" is not a chattel, contrary to suggestions in the eBay decision. See
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. The court clarified that:
eBay's claim is that BE's use is appropriating eBay's personal property by using
valuable bandwidth and capacity, and necessarily compromising eBay's ability to use
that capacity for its own purposes. ... [I]t is undisputed that eBay's server and its
capacity are personal property, and that BE's searches use a portion of this property.
Even if, as BE argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay's computer system
capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its
personal property for its own purposes.
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use of the server, eBay obtained an injunction from the district court
prohibiting Bidder's Edge from "using any automated query program,
robot, web crawler or other similar device, without written
authorization, to access eBay's computer systems or networks, for the
69
purpose of copying any part of eBay's auction database."
Critics of the district court decision emphatically argue that the court
misunderstood the stakes of its decision. 70 By granting an injunction on
the facts of eBay v. Bidder's Edge, the district court effectively treated
the chattels at issue as the equivalent of land and effectively created a
new intellectual property right. The district court did not expressly do
either of these things. Although the court acknowledged that "an
ongoing trespass of a computer system... is more akin to the
traditional notion of a trespass to real property ... than the traditional
notion of a trespass to chattels," and that "applying traditional legal
principles to the [facts of the] Internet can be troublesome," 7 1 the court
Id. Capacity is a technological and economic variable that, depending on the context in which it
is used, may describe the data processing ability of a computer system, the data storage ability of
a computer system, and/or the information carrying ability of telecommunications facilities. See,
e.g., ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 353 (Christopher Morris
ed., 2002) (defining capacity as "the maximum rate at which a computer system can process
work"; "the total amount of data that a computer memory component can store."); NEWTON'S
TELECOM DICTIONARY 149 (16th ed. 2000) (explaining the different capacity measurements for
different facilities, such as data lines, switches, and coaxial cables). See generally MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 168 (10th ed. 2000) (defining capacity as "the potential or
suitability for holding, storing, or accommodating" and also as "the facility or power to produce,
perform, or deploy"). It is important to realize that the amount of capacity consumed by a
particular user is potentially relevant to the measurement of damages.
Like physical
infrastructure resources, server capacity is not always rivalrously consumed; it is only
"sometimes rivalrous[ly]" consumed, and it is renewable (absent a crash or other damaging
incident).
Cf. Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention
into
the
Market, 2
COLUM.
SC1.
&
TECH.
L.
REV.
1,
25-29,
at
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume2/frischmannintro.pdf (2001) (analyzing Internet infrastructure as
a sometimes rivalrous, renewable good).
69. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
70. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 12, at 527-29 (arguing that what was at stake was
information rather than real property).
71. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. Interestingly, the court makes this acknowledgment after
stating the following:
If eBay were a brick and mortar auction house with limited seating capacity, eBay
would appear to be entitled to reserve those seats for potential bidders, to refuse
entrance to individuals (or robots) with no intention of bidding on any of the items, and
to seek preliminary injunctive relief against non-customer trespassers eBay was
physically unable to exclude. The analytic difficulty is that a wrongdoer can commit
an ongoing trespass of a computer system that is more akin to the traditional notion of
a trespass to real property, than the traditional notion of a trespass to chattels, because
even though it is ongoing, it will probably never amount to a conversion.
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expressly maintained that it was applying the trespass to chattels
doctrine to the facts of the case. As noted above, the academic criticism
of eBay and related cases seems to build from the premise that courts
are simply not understanding the underlying facts or fully appreciating
the consequences of their decisions.
Based on its opinion, the eBay court does not appear to choose either
an internal or external perspective of the facts. 72 Instead, the court
alternates between perspectives, at times looking at the chattel (the
server) from a virtual perspective and focusing on it as a "space" or
"place" that end users visit and occupy, 73 and at times looking at the
chattel from a real-space perspective and focusing on the server's
technical operations and its capacity to handle, process, and respond to
queries from other end users. To understand the implications of this
let's consider what the facts
inadvertent shifting between perspectives,
74
perspective.
each
from
like
look
According to the internal perspective, end users (including Bidder's
Edge) visit eBay's auction website. In cyberspace, a website is a place
of business-visiting an auction website in cyberspace looks like
visiting an auction house in the physical world.75 Auction houses have
limited capacity to accommodate visitors (e.g., limited seats), and so do
auction websites 7 6 because servers have finite capacity to accommodate
72. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064-71. But cf Hunter, supra note 5, at 482-88 (arguing
that trespass to chattels has evolved poorly in the cyberspace context because courts have relied
on the cyberpsace as place metaphor).
73. Although the court does expressly reject eBay's internal perspective "argument that BE's
activities should be thought of as equivalent to sending in an army of 100,000 robots a day to
check the prices in a competitor's store," the court's basis for rejecting the argument is that
eBay's store is not a "brick and mortar" store and "[miore importantly, for the analogy to be
accurate, the robots would have to make up less than two out of every one-hundred customers in
the store, the robots would not interfere with the customers' shopping experience, nor would the
robots even be seen by the customers." eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065-66. This does not seem to
be a rejection of the internal perspective altogether, but rather seems focused on the type of
interference caused by the trespassory conduct.
74. While the court does not expressly adopt one perspective over the other and instead seems
to oscillate between perspectives, see, e.g., id. at 1070 (discussing the unauthorized use of eBay's
chattel and referring to eBay's website, electronic database, server, and computer systems),
Hunter and other critics of the eBay decision may be correct that the court effectively chooses the
internal perspective (or cyberspace as place metaphor) and possibly in the manner advocated by
Kerr. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 484; cf. Kerr, supra note 1, at 391 (suggesting that courts
should look to the doctrine itself and determine "whether the law is more closely attuned to
external or internal concerns").
75. 1acknowledge that this is virtual reality at its extreme.
76. Although the court did not focus exclusively on the website, its discussion often appeared
to conflate server and website. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. Viewing the facts from an
internal perspective makes it easier for courts to envision the defendant trespassing on or in the
server because of the virtual connection to the website.
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visitors. 77 Application of the trespass to chattels doctrine seems to flow

from this view of the facts quite easily: unauthorized visitors are
deemed trespassers because they are entering the website and using the
resource without authorization, and this conduct causes harm to the
78
chattel in the sense that limited (and valuable) "space" is consumed.
Merely visiting an auction website does not cause harm per se; nor
does visiting an auction house without permission. 79 Actual harm is not
required in the auction house context because the applicable trespass
doctrine is trespass to land, not trespass to chattels. Thus, we can see
why academics have concluded that the trespass to chattels doctrine
effectively morphs into trespass to land (as an auction website looks like
an auction house, the damages requirement disappears). 80
This
77. That auction houses and auction websites both have finite capacity does not mean that
capacity is scarce for either resource. There may be ample capacity for unauthorized visitors in
both contexts. Contrary to the analysis in eBay, consumption of a "small amount of... capacity"
does not necessarily deprive a property owner of her ability to use her property in either context
-whether an auction house or an auction website. See supra note 68 (arguing that server
capacity is not always rivalrously consumed and is renewable).
78. Although the court rested on its finding that eBay would likely prove that Bidder's Edge's
unauthorized queries "diminished the quality or value of eBay's computer systems," eBay, 100 F.
Supp. 2d at 1071, it remains unclear whether a plaintiff may rely on a showing of unauthorized
use of a server alone to establish both trespassory conduct and harm. See Oyster Software, Inc. v.
Forms Processing, Inc., No. COO-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001)
(holding that, under eBay, unauthorized use of a computer system is sufficient to establish a
trespass to chattels cause of action); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same). But see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99-CV 7654, 2000
WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (holding that eBay requires more than negligible
interference).
79. Cf. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065-66.
80. Perhaps there is an alternative explanation. There are hints in the opinion that the court
was viewing capacity itself as a chattel and found that Bidder's Edge dispossessed eBay of its
capacity, in which case a showing of damages would be unnecessary. Although this sounds
ridiculous-capacity cannot be a chattel because it is a descriptive variable about a chattel
(whether a computer server or a water bucket), see supra note 68 for a discussion of the concept
of capacity and the eBay court's alluding to capacity as chattel. The court's analysis of the
damage element suggests some confusion:
Although eBay does not claim that this consumption has led to any physical damage to
eBay's computer system, nor does eBay provide any evidence to support the claim that
it may have lost revenues or customers based on this use, eBay's claim is that BE's use
is appropriating eBay's personal property by using valuable bandwidth and capacity,
and necessarily compromising eBay's ability to use that capacity for its own purposes.
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (footnote omitted). By characterizing eBay's "bandwidth and
capacity" as "valuable" and suggesting that Bidder's Edge's use of bandwidth and capacity
"necessarily compromis[ed] eBay's ability to use that capacity," the court seemed to be treating
capacity as the chattel, rather than the server. Id. The court continued:
[I]t is undisputed that eBay's server and its capacity are personal property, and that
BE's searches use a portion of this property. Even if, as BE argues, its searches use
only a small amount of eBay's computer system capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived
eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes.
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conflation of trespass to chattels and trespass to land is problematic
81
because it unravels carefully constructed walls between doctrines.
Yet, if you take the internal perspective seriously, you might think
that there is no problem with the morphing of chattels to land because
we are talking about virtual land. You might argue that "trespass to
land in cyberspace" is equivalent to "trespass to chattels in the real
space" because land in cyberspace is just real-space chattel, the
server. 82 If one strictly adheres to an internal perspective of the facts,
this seems to make sense because it is "space" on the server that is
being used without authorization and causing harm to the plaintiff, who
owns the server and website.
This line of reasoning-premised on strict adoption of the internal
perspective and the facts isolated by this perspective-breaks down,
however, because "land in cyberspace" is not just "chattels in real
space." The factual premise is flawed:8 3 "land in cyberspace" is really
The law recognizes no such right to use another's personal property. Accordingly,
BE's actions appear to have caused injury to eBay and appear likely to continue to
cause injury to eBay.
Id.; see also Register.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250 ("[E]vidence of mere possessory
interference is sufficient to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to establish a claim for
trespass to chattels."). Under this alternative explanation, the problem is not that "chattel
becomes land" but rather that a new possessory interest in capacity is created and given legal
protection. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 528 & n.27 (noting that the eBay court's discussion of
inherent injury was dictum).
81. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 57, at 33. As discussed previously, eliminating the damages
element of the trespass to chattels cause of action based on unauthorized use or intermeddling
effectively conflates either (1) trespass to chattels with trespass to land or (2) trespass by
unauthorized use or intermeddling with trespass by dispossession. See supra note 59. While
scholars have focused on the former view based perhaps on the belief that courts have been
adopting an internal perspective of the facts, the latter view also seems to fit as well. To the
extent that courts view server capacity itself as a chattel, then unauthorized use of the server
constitutes trespass by dispossession. Of course, as noted previously, server capacity is not a
chattel. See supra note 68.
82. Cf. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003). The California Supreme Court
noted that:
Professor Epstein suggests that a company's server should be its castle, upon which
any unauthorized intrusion, however harmless, is a trespass.
Epstein's argument derives, in part, from the familiar metaphor of the Internet as a
physical space, reflected in much of the language that has been used to describe it:
"cyberspace," "the information superhighway," e-mail "addresses," and the
like ....
[C]yberspace" itself has come to be known by the oxymoronic phrase
"virtual reality," which would suggest that any real property "located" in "cyberspace"
must be "virtually real" property. Metaphor is a two-edged sword.
Id.
83. Cf. id. (rejecting the factual premise underlying Epstein's argument, stating, "The plain
fact is that computers, even those making up the Internet, are-like such older communications
equipment as telephones and fax machines-personal property, not realty."). Note that Hamidi
and other push cases are factually distinguishable (and should be distinguished) from pull cases,

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

a virtual construct derived from, among other things, applications
84
running on your computer and information provided by the server.
While the server and your computer are real-space chattels, the
information and applications are not. Critically, we do not get this far if
we view the facts exclusively from the internal perspective. We need to
85
take into account facts brought into focus by the external perspective.
According to the external perspective, the facts look a bit different.
Bidder's Edge and eBay are end users. Bidder's Edge, hooked up at
"one end of the Internet" with its computer system, sends requests for
data to eBay, hooked up at "another end of the Internet" with its
computer system; the eBay system receives the Bidder's Edge requests
86
and responds by sending the information requested by Bidder's Edge.
Viewed in this light, a query sent to eBay is a communication between
end users-a request for information-just like any other Internet
communication. Application of the trespass to chattels doctrine does
not seem to flow from this view of the facts quite so easily.
Assuming for purposes of argument the validity of the Thrifty-Tel v.
Bezenek holding that "electronic signals" are "sufficiently tangible to
support a trespass cause of action,"87 and that eBay did not authorize
Bidder's Edge to send multiple, repeated queries to eBay's computer
system, 88 let's consider whether the conduct of Bidder's Edge

constitutes an interference with eBay's possessory interest in its server.
especially pull cases involving commercial websites. In the context of pull cases, the internal
perspective brings into relief the fact that both site owners and visitors treat websites as business
premises, in terms of investment decisions and commercial relationships, for example. The
internal perspective does not yield the same factual insights in the push context.
84. The eBay court alluded to this point. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 n.11.
The phrase "brick and mortar" is often used to designate a traditional business when
contrasting it with a predominantly, or entirely, on-line business. The phrase appears
to refer to the historical reliance on conducting commerce within the context of a
physical space made from materials such as brick and mortar, as opposed to the
modern trend toward conducting commerce in a cyberspace made from computer
programs.
Id.
85. The external perspective reminds us that we are talking about a number of complementary
resources-Internet infrastructure (physical and logical), computer systems at the "ends" of the
infrastructure, applications running on those systems, and information sent back and forth by
those systems across the infrastructure.
86. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 12, at 523-24 (describing Internet communication "as a
technical matter").
87. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996). For a critique
of the possible ramifications of "electronic tresspass," see Burk, supra note 57, at 34.
88. For purposes of this comment, I leave aside the issue of authorization, which is an
important issue for publicly accessible websites. For the court's analysis of authorization, see
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71.
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Putting aside interference by dispossession and interference by
intermeddling, as did the eBay court, we are left asking whether
Bidder's Edge interfered with eBay's possessory interest in its server by
unauthorized use. The eBay court concluded that there was no dispute
that the conduct amounts to use of eBay's computer systems. While
intuitively this seems to make sense-of course, Bidder's Edge used
eBay's server when it searched the website and gathered informationit may be worth more careful consideration. How exactly is Bidder's
Edge using eBay's system? What really happens technically? If a
query sent to eBay is just a request for information, a communication
between end users, it seems less89 intuitive and less obvious that Bidder's
Edge is using the eBay system.
Viewing the facts from the external perspective makes the
communication between end users look like a telephone call (at least for
purposes of analyzing whether one end user is using the other's chattel
Suppose a Bidder's Edge
when the end users communicate). 90
the eBay employee
the
telephone,
employee calls an eBay employee on
answers the phone, the Bidder's Edge employee asks the eBay
employee a question, and the eBay employee answers the question. Has
Bidder's Edge used eBay's telephone (the chattel)? I think the answer
must be no. 9 1 Should the answer change if we substitute "computer
system" for "employee"? In other words, should the automated nature
of the communications alter our conception of use? Probably not,
unless someone is capable of exercising dominion over the use of

89. Cf. Lemley, supra 12, at 528-29 (stating that by requesting information, Bidder's Edge
did not exclude others from using eBay's cite and arguing that this information is a public good to
which "inviolability" of property law is inapplicable).
90. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 12, at 524 n.12.
Indeed, the analogy to the telephone is more exact than it might at first appear. Most
Internet users even today access the Internet through a dial-up modem, which takes
data from a computer and converts it to analog sounds that are sent over a telephone
line just like the human voice. For these users, the technical reality of Internet
communication is essentially identical to telephonic communication. Only what is
being "said" and the way it is perceived differ.
Id.; see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003) (analogizing e-mail and
telephone communications).
91. The eBay court did not view the query as a simple communication between end users.
Instead, it viewed a query as a means of accessing eBay's private property. The court's analysis
of whether the conduct of Bidder's Edge constitutes an interference with eBay's possessory
interest in its server seems confused because the court refers not only to eBay's server and
computer systems, which are chattel, but also to eBay's electronic database and website, which
are not chattel. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

another's computer system, 92 which is not something that has been
alleged in any of the trespass to chattels cases.
Ultimately, the external perspective focuses one's attention on a
number of important differences between real space and cyberspace, the

most important of which is the fact that "the content of the Internet
consists only of information." 9 3 The academic critiques of eBay (and
similar trespass to chattels decisions) hone in on this point-the case
was really about access to information because it was information that
Bidder's Edge requested from eBay and it was information that eBay
sought to control. 94 Effectively treating servers (chattels) as the
equivalent of land effectively creates a new intellectual property right
because server owners may effectively control access to and use of
information that is not protected by any existing intellectual property
95
right.

92. Lemley, supra note 12, at 526 (noting that content on the Internet is a public good that is
easily duplicated and used without deprivation, whereas chattels and real property are difficult, if
not impossible, to duplicate, and use necessarily involves deprivation).
93. Id. Lemley lists the following examples of "obvious differences between the way things
work in the physical world and the way they work online":
- While in the physical world I can occupy only one place at a time, on the Internet Ior at least my data---can be everywhere at once (and indeed it is often hard to avoid
doing so).
- Physical stores have spatial constraints that limit the number of customers who can
enter the store. While there are some constraints on simultaneous usage of a website or
the Internet itself, for most users and for most purposes bandwidth is effectively
infinite.
. Physical places exist in proximity to one another, and human senses can perceive
what is happening next door. In cyberspace, by contrast, there is no "next door." Nor
is there a public street or sidewalk from which one might observe behavior that occurs
in a particular Internet space.
- The content of the Internet consists only of information, and information is a public
good. A website is trivial to copy, and copying it does not deprive its creator of the use
of the original site. By contrast, chattels are much harder to copy, and real property is
by definition impossible to duplicate. In order to make use of someone else's real
property, I would have to deprive them of some control over it.
Id. at 525-26 (footnote omitted). Of course, these differences are not so obvious if one chooses
an internal perspective, and they have not been obvious to courts. See, e.g., id. at 527-29
(suggesting that courts have been misled by metaphors and have not understood the differences).
94. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 540-41 (stating that in Internet trespass cases, defendants
attempt to either acquire or convey information).
95. Id. at 537 (suggesting that "in eBay, the rights that the court granted eBay exceed anything
it could have obtained offline").
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Thus, in addition to affecting legal analysis, 9 6 focusing exclusively

on one perspective of the facts may obscure (or remove entirely) from
consideration important interests at stake in a decision. The internal
perspective focuses one's attention on the chattel owner's interest in the
The external
physical chattel and virtual business premises.
perspective, on the other hand, focuses one's attention on the competing
interests in intangible information assets. Neither perspective standing
alone illuminates the full range of interests at stake.
Yet, taken together, the internal and external perspectives reveal

important insights and raise important questions about the underlying
balance of interests: on one hand, it is important that end users
(including website owners) consider websites to be business premises.

This finding may indicate that end users' expectations and investment
decisions may be best served by treating "land in cyberspace" like land
in real space, and it may also be relevant to community notions of what
constitutes wrongful conduct. On the other hand, it is also important
that websites are not the product of servers and computer systems alone,

but rather they require another essential input: information. This fact
counsels caution in creating property rights for websites because

96.

This chart provides an abbreviated summary of the legal analysis:

Trespass to
Chattels
Standard
Unauthorized
Use of
Chattel?

Harm

Internal/
Cyberspace
Perspective
Chattel: server/
website.
Use: Entering
website without
authorization
constitutes
unauthorized use of
site and its limited
capacity.
* Analogous to
visiting auction
house.
If website is treated
the same as
business premises,
then no real need to
show harm (like
trespass to land);
consumption of
valuable "space"
constitutes harm.

External/Internet
Perspective
Chattel: server.
Use: Sending
unauthorized
queries does not
constitute
unauthorized use.
* Analogous to
telephone call.

If querying
constitutes use,
need to look at
congestion-related
harms,

Both Perspectives
Chattel: server / website.
Important link between server,
information, website, and end
users' expectations.
Use: Both analogies fall short;
use of server seems more
plausible than telephone
scenario suggests; end user
expectations and community
standards may be shaped by
association of website with
business premises.
May have congestion-related
harm. Should loss of control
over one's online business
premises be sufficient? Are
investment-based expectations
undermined? Might the
business owner suffer
reputational harm among
customers?

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

intellectual property and First Amendment doctrines already strike a
balance among public and private interests in access to and control over
the use of various types of information. Thus, a decision made with
respect to websites ought to take into account the competing interests in
controlling access to information assets.
At the outset of this Article, I suggested that the third step to
reconciling Internet and cyberspace requires a principled application of
relevant legal doctrines. This may require the application of a particular
rule to a set of facts complicated by the nuances highlighted by the two
perspectives. Or it may require consideration of complex intersections
among traditionally independent areas of the law. Recognizing that
legal doctrines have developed to address each type of interest as a
separate, independent discipline, it may be necessary to adopt an
interdisciplinary approach to reconcile intersecting areas of the law.
While difficult, this has been done, for example, in the context of the
intersection of antitrust law and intellectual property law, where federal
courts have integrated antitrust considerations into intellectual property
law through the common-law doctrines of copyright and patent
misuse. 97 I intend to address this third step fully in Reconciling Internet
and Cyberspace. Let me give a brief glimpse of where I am going in
the context of trespass to chattels.
Once we accept that both perspectives are valid and recognize the
three types of interests at stake, it becomes clear that we cannot apply
traditional trespass to chattels doctrine in a vacuum. Other areas of the
law, such as trespass to land, intellectual property, and the First
Amendment, 9 8 are certainly implicated and should factor into any legal
analysis. There are many ways that this could happen. For example,
suppose a court were to follow Professor McGowan's advice and, in the
context of applying the common-law doctrine of trespass to chattels,
create a property rule for websites. 99 As noted above, such a rule would

97. See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 875
(2000) (arguing that "[c]ommon law misuse allows courts to develop rules that evolve
dynamically" and "reconcil[e] ... relationships between the related and interdependent bodies of
antitrust, copyright, and patent law").
98. The idea of incorporating First Amendment considerations into state tort law is by no
means novel; a First Amendment defense to state tort claims has been recognized in a number of
contexts. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (recognizing First
Amendment defense to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing First Amendment defense to defamation claim).
99. See McGowan, supra note 18, at 367-87. I am not endorsing the creation of a property
rule here. I am simply explaining how a court that accepted the validity of both perspectives and
recognized the various interests at stake might proceed to reconcile the competing interests.
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effectively provide exclusive rights over the server and some
information not ordinarily protected by any intellectual property
right.' 0 0 Such a rule might be cabined by an equitable defense
analogous to the copyright or patent misuse doctrine that protected
against overreaching by website owners (i.e., owners seeking to exert
control over information, or other resources, outside the scope of the
website).
At the Conference, I noted that this might be an appropriate commonlaw method for reconciling the competing interests at stake. This
route-property rule plus misuse defense-recognizes both perspectives
as valid; recognizes the connection between website, server,
information, and end users' expectations; and recognizes that the
traditional trespass to chattels tort is being stretched to protect a
traditional chattel (server) and traditional non-chattel (information)
because these resources act as complementary inputs into the production
of websites (virtual business premises).
1II. CONCLUSION

Cyberlaw is about evolution-technological evolution, legal
evolution, and the evolving relationship between law and technology.
Cyberlaw disputes often involve novel facts and contexts because of
rapidly evolving technologies.
While the Internet infrastructure
represents an amazing technological breakthrough and continues to
evolve in significant ways, we must also be cognizant of the fact that
Internet-enabled applications, content delivery mechanisms, and types
of content are also evolving, as are the relationships among end users.
All of these "moving parts" make the facts of the Internet
complicated, multifaceted, and context-dependent. The problem of
perspective is, at first cut, about unconscious, inadvertent, or implicit
choices of how to look at the facts. Orin Kerr persuasively makes this
point.' 0 ' Choosing a perspective can determine the outcome of a
decision, and it would be better if such choices were made consciously
and explicitly. But the true danger, as I have argued, is in the perceived
need to choose a perspective, where both perspectives yield accurate but
different renditions of the facts and provide important insights into the

100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting the ramifications of affording the
equivalent of property rights to servers); see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003)
(declining to extend the common-law doctrine of trespass to chattels to electronic
communications and create a property rule for computer servers).
101. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 357-58 (noting that courts and commentators switch between
perspectives without ever realizing it).
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interests at stake in a particular context and the connections (or links)
between those interests.
To illustrate, let us return to the trespass to chattels example.
Adopting an internal perspective of the facts, you might argue that we
should treat trespassing on business premises the same, whether the
trespass occurs in cyberspace or real space. 10 2 Adopting an external
perspective of the facts, I might counter your argument by stating that
your argument rests on the false premise that websites are business
premises. And around and around we go, arguing about which is the
right perspective and which is the wrong perspective. The problem with
our debate is that both perspectives are descriptively valid, and the
normative argument is an important one that deserves careful

analysis. 103

102. Cf. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (comparing ongoing trespass to business premises in
cyberspace with ongoing trespass to business premises in real space).
103. Cf McGowan, supra note 18, at 358-60.

